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Background and objectives: Trauma victims, such as war veterans, often remember 
additional traumatic events over time: the “memory amplification effect”. This effect is 
associated with the re-experiencing symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 
including frequent and intrusive images of the traum . One explanation for memory 
amplification is that people gradually incorporate new, imagined information about the 
trauma with what they actually experienced, leading to an amplified memory for what 
actually happened. We investigated this proposal here. Methods: Participants viewed highly 
negative and graphic photographs and recorded their intrusions. Critically, we instructed 
some participants to elaborate on their intrusions—that is, we asked them to imagine details 
about the trauma beyond what they actually witnessed. We assessed memory for the 
traumatic photos twice, 24-hours apart. Results: The elaboration condition experienced fewer 
intrusions about the photos compared to the control condition.  Furthermore, the elaboration 
condition were less susceptible to memory amplification compared to controls. Limitations: 
The use of negative photos allowed experimental control, however does not permit 
generalization of our findings to real-world traumatic experiences. Conclusions: Our findings 
suggest that effortful imagination of new trauma-related details leads to a reduction in 
intrusions and an increased tendency to not endorse trauma exposure over time. One 
explanation for this finding is that elaboration enha ced conceptual processing of the trauma 
analogue, therefore reducing intrusions. Critically, this reduction in intrusions affected 
participants’ tendency to endorse trauma exposure, which is consistent with the reality-
monitoring explanation for memory amplification.  
 
 
















Trauma survivors—such as veterans—can be inconsistet when remembering past 
events, usually by remembering additional traumatic events (civilian death) over time—
termed the “memory amplification” effect (Southwick, Morgan, Nicolaou, & Charney, 1997). 
Memory amplification is associated with the re-experiencing symptoms of post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD), including intrusive trauma-rel ted images (Roemer, Litz, Orsillo, 
Ehlich, & Friedman, 1998). People with PTSD also often experience involuntary elaborative 
non-memories (thoughts or images about non-experienced event details; Reynolds & Brewin, 
1998), such as mental imagery from similar events wi nessed in the media. Thus, one 
explanation for amplification is that people gradually incorporate imagined trauma-related 
information into their memory, causing difficulty in distinguishing experienced and non-
experienced events and a tendency to endorse exposure t  non-experienced events. 
Accordingly, enhancing imagination of trauma-related d tails should also encourage memory 
amplification. We investigated this proposal.  
The memory amplification effect arises in diverse samples, including 9/11 disaster 
restoration workers (Giosan, Malta, Jayasinghe, Spielman, & Difede, 2009) and witnesses to 
a school shooting (Schwarz, Kowalski, & McNally, 1993). For example, Giosan and 
colleagues asked 9/11 restoration workers whether they experienced (yes/no) stressful events 
(seeing human remains), on two occasions one year apart. Workers answered “yes” more 
often at the second assessment and this increase was associated with PTSD symptom 
severity. Other studies have replicated the typically small, but significant relationship 
between PTSD symptoms and number of no-to-yes changes, including correlation 
coefficients of 0.26 [0.22, 0.30] (King et al., 2000) and 0.32 [0.17, 0.60] (Southwick et al., 
1997). Importantly, this relationship is usually stronger when focusing on re-experiencing 














Although field research suggests PTSD may contribute to memory amplification, 
these studies cannot test the mechanism(s) underlying th s association. Recently, we 
investigated the memory amplification effect in thelaboratory (Oulton, Takarangi, & Strange, 
2016). Participants viewed negative photos (e.g., mutilation) and then completed two 
recognition tests—identifying photos as “old” (previously seen) or “new” (previously 
unseen)— one week apart. Participants’ ability to distinguish old and new photos (i.e., their 
sensitivity) decreased over time. Further, among participants exhibiting memory 
amplification—responding “old” to more photos over time—re-experiencing symptoms were 
associated with memory amplification (r=-.28, 95% CI [-0.48, -.05]).  
One possibility is that re-experiencing symptoms causally contribute to memory 
amplification (King et al., 2000; Strange & Takarangi, 2012). Specifically, people might 
mistake information they imagine—via re-experiencing symptoms—with what actually 
occurred. Indeed, people commonly determine a memory’s igin using heuristics 
(familiarity; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993) and if internally-generated information 
is familiar and vivid, people can mistake this information as a memory of a true experience 
(Johnson et al., 1993). Memory amplification may reflect an accumulation of these errors. 
Consider, for example, a veteran who frequently experiences intrusions that include details he 
did not actually experience during service. These cognitions may encourage an impression 
that he experienced many distressing experiences during service. Consequently, when asked 
about his trauma exposure, he might experience difficulty distinguishing experienced and 
non-experienced events and endorse exposure to non-experienced events that are only 
vaguely familiar. Put differently, due to reality-monitoring errors, the veteran might lower his 
response criterion (how much evidence required to endorse trauma exposure) because he 
assumes the probability of exposure is higher than re lity, and his memory accuracy might 














imagined details. People sometimes experience “worst case scenario” intrusions 
(Merckelbach, Muris, Horselenberg, & Rassin, 1998) that are exaggerated trauma-related, 
image-based cognitions and cognitions involving plausible extensions of the trauma 
(Reynolds & Brewin, 1998).  
Yet no research has investigated the reality-monitori g explanation experimentally.  
Further, intrusions could cause memory amplification via several pathways. For example, 
intrusions might motivate people to justify their distress, causing a liberal response bias. 
Alternatively, the internal generation of new details per se might cause amplification. We 
investigated the latter possibility here. Specifically, we examined whether elaborating on 
intrusions about graphic photos—imagining details beyond what was witnessed—would 
enhance memory amplification. We anticipated this process would increase the opportunity 
for reality-monitoring errors, thereby encouraging memory amplification. 
To test this prediction, following Oulton et al. (2016), participants viewed negative 
photos and, later completed a recognition test on tw  occasions, 24 hours apart. However, 
some participants received instructions encouraging imagination of new, trauma-related 





We predetermined a target sample size of at least 48 participants per condition, which 
we rounded to at least 50; a precision analysis (Cumming, 2013) revealed this sample size 
was sufficient to obtain a target margin of error (the half width of the target confidence 
interval) of 0.4, based on an estimated medium effect (d=0.50). Overall, 126 participants 














60 hours after the first test, 13 who did not experience intrusions1, two who misinterpreted 
instructions and three who inadvertently received the wrong test or diary. Thus, our final 
sample consisted of 106 participants (35.8% male); 75 university students, who received 
course credit or an honorarium and 31 community members who received an honorarium. 
Participants were aged 18-56 (M=24.85, 95% CI [23.14, 26.56]); most identified as 
Caucasian (including White; 66.0%); others as Asian (11.3%), mixed ethnic origin (6.6%), 
European (5.7%), Hispanic (4.7%), African (1.9%) or Other (3.8%).  
2.2. Materials 
2.2.1. Trauma Analogue.  
We selected 70 IAPS photographs (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) and 10 
additional photos (Krans, Langner, Reinecke, & Pearson, 2013) of negative scenes 
(mutilation) and divided them into four sets of 20 target photos (see Oulton et al., 2016) 
matched on valence and category membership; how well each photo matched the overall 
“theme” of the photos (Fs < 1). Participants saw two sets (40 target photos) at encoding. 
Photos appeared for 500ms on five, randomly timed, occasions during encoding. Thus, each 
photo appeared for 2.5 seconds total. An additional 20 negative photos—10 IAPS photos and 
10 photos from Krans et al.—acted as primacy and recency buffers (same for every 
participant), presented only once for 500ms, and never appeared at test. Sets were 
counterbalanced across participants such that each combination was presented equally. 
2.2.2. Trauma History Screen (THS). 
 We administered the THS (Carlson et al., 2011) to assess exposure to high magnitude 
stressor (HMS) events (sudden events that cause extreme distress in most people exposed), 
traumatic stressor (TS) events (HMS events associated with extreme distress) and events 
associated with persisting posttraumatic distress (PPD events). The THS has excellent 
                                               
1 To ensure all participants within the elaboration c dition were exposed to the experimental manipulation, 
across both conditions we included only participants who reported at least one intrusion during either  














temporal stability (HMS events: r= 0.93; PPD events: r=0.73) and strong convergent validity 
(Carlson et al., 2011). After completing the THS, participants completed the PTSD checklist 
for DSM-5 (Weathers et al., 2013) in relation to their most distressing event. In the current 
study, Cronbach’s alpha for PCL-5 scores was .93. 
2.2.3. Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II).  
We used the 21-item BDI-II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) to measure depression 
symptoms experienced during the past two weeks. Particip nts rated items on a Likert scale 
(0=I do not feel like a failure, 3=I feel I am a total failure as a person; range: 0–63). Internal 
consistency (a=0.93; Beck et al., 1996) and construct validity among university students 
(Oliver & Burkham, 1979) is good. Cronbach’s alpha for BDI-II scores was .90 for our study 
sample. 
2.2.4. State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait Scale (STAI-T).  
We used the 20-item STAI-T (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) to measure 
participants’ stable propensity to experience anxiety. Participants rate items (“I feel nervous 
and restless”) from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always) (range: 20–80). Test-retest 
reliability (r=0.88) (Barnes, Harp, & Jung, 2002) and concurrent validity with other anxiety 
questionnaires is good (Spielberger, 1983). Internal consistency was high for our study 
sample (Cronbach’s alpha=.91) 
2.2.5. Global Rumination Scale (GRS).  
The GRS (McIntosh & Martin, 1992) measures a predisposition toward repetitive 
thought. Because people’s trait tendency to ruminate might influence how they elaborate on 
intrusions, we wanted to ensure our conditions were equivalent. Participants rated 10 
statements (“When I have a problem I tend to think of it a lot of he time”) from 1 (does not 
describe me well) to 7 (describes me well). The scale has adequate test-retest reliability 














Craske, 2000). Previous research (Segerstrom et al., 2000) among undergraduate students has 
revealed a Cronbach’s alpha of .66 for GRS scores. For our study sample, Cronbach’s alpha 
was .69.  
2.2.6. Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). 
 We used the 20-item PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) to measure 
participants’ positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA).  Participants rated each item (e.g., 
“afraid”) according to how they felt at the present moment (1=Very slightly or not at all, 
5=Extremely).  The measure has excellent temporal stability (NA: r= 0.81, PA: r=0.79) and 
convergent and divergent validity (Watson et al., 1988). In the current study, Cronbach’s 
alpha for Positive Affect was .89 and .86 before and fter photo exposure, respectively. 
Cronbach’s alpha for Negative Affect was .83 and .87, respectively.  
2.2.7. Intrusion monitoring task. 
 We instructed participants to close their eyes and “think about whatever [they] 
like[d]” for 10 minutes after encoding. We also told participants to press a computer key 
whenever they experienced an intrusion during this period (Kubota, Nixon, & Chen, 2015). 
We described intrusions as recollections of the photographs that appeared involuntarily in 
consciousness. Immediately after every key press, we prompted participants to describe the 
intrusion in a booklet and then close their eyes again. We asked participants to limit their 
description to one sentence. The time participants spent describing their intrusions was 
included within the 10-min time limit. Thus, the task terminated after 10-min, regardless of 
how long participants spent describing their intrusion . At the end, participants rated their 
intrusions (overall) on: vividness, associated distress and degree of visual detail (1=not at all, 
5=extremely) and how hard they tried to push intrusions out of their mind, how much the 
experience felt like it was happening “right now”, how aware they were of their surroundings, 














2.2.8. Recognition test.  
The recognition tests consisted of three sets of 20 photos: one set of “Old” (previously 
presented) negative photos and two sets of “New” (previously unseen) photos. One set of 
New photos were neutrally valenced IAPS photos—to check participants were attending to 
test items—and the other was a target negative photo set that was never previously shown. 
Test items appeared in a random order. Participants identified each photo as old or new and 
indicated their confidence (0=not at all confident, 10=extremely confident). 
We constructed 12 different versions of the test, counterbalanced so every target 
photo appeared equally often as ‘new’ and ‘old’ across participants. Test items presented at 
T2 were completely different to test items presented at T1. Therefore, incorrect 
identifications at T2 could not reflect participants mistaking photos from the first test as 
originating from encoding. 
2.2.9. Elaboration Exercise.  
After the T1 test, the experimenter read aloud the elaboration exercise instructions to 
participants in the elaboration condition who experienced intrusions during the monitoring 
period. We designed our instructions to encourage internal generation of details beyond what 
the photos displayed, and concrete thinking (distinct and situationally specific thoughts) 
rather than abstract thinking (indistinct and cross-situational thoughts; Stöber & Borkovec, 
2002) which is associated with rumination and worry (Watkins & Moulds, 2005). 
Specifically, the experimenter instructed participants to “imagine that you are present at the 
scene you have pictured” and “form a mental image of the specific events” that could have 
occurred beforehand and afterwards. See Appendix A for full instructions. 
Participants completed the elaboration task for evey r corded intrusion and described 
what they imagined. However, when participants repoted multiple intrusions with the same 














participants who experienced no intrusions (N=8) received the intrusion diary (which 
included the elaboration exercise) after completing the first test.  
2.3.10. Intrusion diary. 
 Participants recorded intrusions in a paper diary for 24-hours after leaving the lab. 
For each intrusion, participants recorded the intrusion’s content and indicated the type 
(image, thought or combination) on a single page. Participants also rated (1=not at all, 
5=extremely/completely) the level of associated distress, vividness, how ard they tried to 
push it out of their mind, how much it felt as though the experience was happening “right 
now”, awareness of current surroundings, how “out of the blue” the intrusion was, and how 
much the accompanying emotions reflected the emotions experienced at the time they viewed 
the photos. Diaries given to elaboration participants also included the elaboration exercise on 
the back of each page, which they were instructed to fill out immediately after experiencing 
each intrusion.  
2.2.11. PTSD Checklist (PCL).  
We used the PCL for DSM-IV (Weathers, Litz, Herman, Huska & Keane, 1993) to 
assess participants’ analogue PTSD symptoms in relation to the photos after completing the 
first memory test2 and again, 24 hours after encoding. We used the PCL-IV because we 
thought the items were more applicable to experiences following a trauma analogue relative 
to some items in the PCL for DSM-5 (“blaming yourself or someone for the stressful 
experience or what happened after it”). Participants rated how much 17 items (“feeling 
jumpy or easily startled,” 1=not at all, 5=extremely; range: 17-85) bothered them since 
viewing the photos. The PCL has high test-retest reliability (r= .96; Weathers et al., 1993) and 
correlates strongly with the Clinician Administered PTSD Scale (r=.93; Blanchard, Jones-
                                               
2 We omitted 5 items, because they are meaningless for a 20-minute delay period (i.e., “repeated, disturbing 
dreams or nightmares ”, “ trying to avoid activities, people or places that remind you of the traumatic event”, 
“ loss of interest in things that you used to enjoy”, “ trouble falling or staying asleep” and “feeling distant or cut 















Alexander, Buckley, & Forneris, 1996). For our study sample, Cronbach’s alpha was .86 and 
.90 at Test 1 and Test 2, respectively.  
2.2.12. Experience of Intrusions Scale (EIS).  
We used the 5-item EIS (Salters-Pedneault, Vine, Mills, Park, & Litz, 2009) to assess 
the frequency, unwantedness and unpredictability of participants’ intrusions over the 24-hour 
delay. Participants rated items (“how distressed were you when these thoughts came to 
mind?”) from 0 (not at all/almost never) to 4 (extremely/very frequently). The EIS has good 
test-retest reliability (r=.83) and correlates with other intrusion measures, including the re-
experiencing subscale of the PCL-C (Weathers et al., 1993; r=.22). Cronbach’s alpha was .83 
for our study sample.  
2.2.13. Response to Intrusions Questionnaire (RIQ).  
We administered the rumination subscale of the RIQ (Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999) to 
assess rumination about intrusions. Participants rated how often they engaged in three 
behavioural and cognitive strategies (“I dwell on them”) when experiencing intrusions about 
the photos during the 24-hour delay (1=not at all, 7=very often). Participants selected ‘0’ if 
they experienced no intrusions. The rumination subscale of the RIQ correlates significantly 
with PTSD symptoms (r=.51), as measured by the Post-traumatic Stress Symptom Scale 
(PSS; Foa, Riggs, Dancu & Rothbaum, 1993). Previous research among ambulance service 
workers has revealed low internal consistency for this short scale (a = .31; Clohessy & 
Ehlers, 1999). Cronbach’s alpha was higher for our st dy sample (a = .73).  
2.3. Procedure 
 This research was approved by the Flinders University Social and Behavioural 
Research Ethics Committee and the City University of New York’s University Integrated 
Institutional Review Board, and conducted in accordance with the provisions of the World 














participation involved viewing graphic photos. To minimize hypothesis guessing, we told 
participants that the study investigated the effect of self-relevance on responses to emotional 
material. 
Participants first completed measures of trauma history, PTSD, depression, trait 
anxiety, rumination and mood, respectively. Next, they viewed the buffer and target 
photographs on a computer. We then asked participants “how closely did you pay attention to 
the photos presented?” (1=not at all, 7=extremely closely). Participants also rated how 
disgusting, distressing and unpleasant the photos were (1=not at all, 7=extremely) and 
completed the mood measure again. Next, participants completed the intrusion monitoring 
task, followed by the recognition test and the modifie  PCL. If participants from either 
condition reported no intrusions during the monitoring period, we then gave them the paper 
diary and accompanying instructions. Alternatively, if the participant experienced intrusions 
and was in the elaboration condition, they completed th  elaboration exercise. To control for 
additional exposure to intrusion descriptions, we asked participants in the control condition 
who experienced intrusions to read their monitoring period booklet and alert the experimenter 
once they had finished. After completing this exercise, participants received the diary and 
accompanying instructions.  
We emailed participants a survey link that contained the PANAS, the delayed 
recognition test, the EIS, PCL and RIQ, respectively, 24-hours after the lab session. We also 
asked participants whether they had voluntarily thought or spoken about the photos over the 
24-hour period. If they responded yes, participants indicated frequency (1=not at all, 5=nearly 
all the time). We then debriefed participants. 















Figure 1. Illustration of procedure for the control condition and the elaboration condition.  
3. Results & Discussion 
3.1 Sample Characteristics 
We first compared conditions on demographics, existing symptomology and trauma 
history. Age, gender and ethnicity did not significantly differ between conditions (ps>.05). 
Table 1 displays descriptive and inferential statisics for existing symptomology measures 












                                               
3 Because some participants who endorsed exposure to repeated stressors (e.g., childhood abuse) reported 
extremely high HMS levels we transformed this data using Winsorization. We used a 95th percentile 
Winsorization in which outliers beyond the 95th percentile in a set of scores are replaced by the score for the 
















Baseline measures administered before manipulation by experimental condition, including 
means (with 95% confidence intervals), and inferential s atistics. 
 
Note. HMS (t) =High Magnitude Stressor Exposure (scores tansformed using Winsorization), 
TS=Traumatic Stressor Exposure, PPD=Persisting Posttraumatic Distress Events Exposure, PCL-5= 
PTSD checklist for DSM-5 (in relation to most distressing event), STAI-T=Trait Subscale of State 
Trait Anxiety Inventory, BDI-II=Beck Depression Inventory, GRS= Global Rumination Scale 
 
3.2 Emotional Impact of Photos 
To determine whether the images were an effective trauma analogue, we analyzed 
participants’ photo ratings, change in affect after photo exposure and analogue PTSD 
symptoms (see Table 2). Participants rated the photos as very unpleasant, disgusting, and 
moderately distressing, and reported paying close attention. There were no differences 
between conditions (ps>.05).  
Next, we compared positive and negative affect scores before and after encoding, 
using 2 (Elaboration, Control) x 2 (Time 1, Time 2) mixed ANOVAs. Main effects of 
condition and interactions between condition and time were not significant (ps>.05). 
However, there were significant main effects of time for positive (F(1, 104)=117.90, p<.001, 
ηp
2= .53, 95% CI [.40, .63]) and negative (F 1, 104)=124.30,  p<.001, ηp
2=.54 [.41, .64]) 
 Control  Elaboration  Statistic 
HMS (t) 5.35[3.23, 7.47] 6.25[3.97, 8.52] t(103)=.58, p=.56, d=0.14 [-0.27, 0.50] 
TS 1.51[1.26, 1.76] 1.88[1.57, 2.19] t(103)=1.88, p=.063, d=0.37 [-0.02, 0.75] 
PPD 0.73[.50, .95] 0.72[.48, .96] t(103)=0.05, p=.96, d=0.01 [-0.37, 0.39] 
PCL-5 23.07[19.07, 27.08] 24.82[20.21, 29.44] t(104)=0.58, p=.57, d=0.11 [-0.27, 0.49] 
STAI-T 46.67[44.20, 49.14] 50.24[47.13, 53.34] t(104)=1.82, p=.072, d=0.35 [-0.03,0.74] 
BDI-II 13.96[11.68, 16.25] 16.12[13.08, 19.15] t(94.73)=1.14, p=.26, d=0.22 [-0.16,0.61] 














affect. Positive affect significantly decreased (d=1.00 [0.78, 1.23]), and negative affect 
significantly increased following encoding, d=1.11 [0.86, 1.35]. 
Table 2. 
Means (with 95% confidence intervals) for photo ratings, affect and analogue PTSD 












Note. PA: positive affect, NA: negative affect, PCL: PTSD Checklist for DSM-IV 
Finally, we compared PCL scores after T1 and T24, using a 2 (Elaboration, Control) x 
2 (Time 1, Time 2) mixed ANOVA. There was a significant main effect of time: PCL scores 
were higher at T1 (M=25.36, 95% CI [23.73, 26.99]) compared to T25 (M=20.72 [19.26, 
22.18]), F(1, 104)=48.82, p<.001, ηp
2=.32 [.18, .44]. It is likely the first PCL captured initial 
symptoms and reactions, which later subsided. There was no significant main effect of 
                                               
4 Three participants had missing data for one PCL item at T2. We substituted these missing values with the 
mean of all valid items on the PCL subscale for that participant.  
5 Note, however, that the PCL we administered at T2 contained 5 more items than the modified PCL 
administered at T1. We therefore excluded these additional items when computing total PCL scores at T2 for 
this analysis. 
 Control  Elaboration  
Photo Ratings (before manipulation)  
Unpleasant 5.80 [5.43, 6.17] 5.65 [5.22, 6.07] 
Distress 4.73 [4.32, 5.14]  4.41 [3.92, 4.91] 
Disgust 5.71 [5.27, 6.15] 5.47 [5.03, 5.91] 
Attention 5.64 [5.34, 5.94] 5.82 [5.47, 6.17] 
Affect (before manipulation)  
PA before photos 29.13 [27.16, 31.09] 27.57 [25.36, 29.78] 
PA after photos 20.58 [18.56, 22.60] 21.51 [19.65, 23.37] 
NA before photos 16.16 [14.73, 17.59] 16.16 [14.58, 17.73] 
NA after photos 24.67 [22.71, 26.64] 22.33 [20.07, 24.60] 
PCL Time 1 (before manipulation)  
Total 25.69 [23.61, 27.77] 25.00 [22.39, 27.61] 
Intrusions 9.84 [8.83, 10.85] 9.61 [8.41, 10.80] 
Arousal 7.89 [7.09, 8.69] 7.49 [6.50, 8.47] 
Avoidance 7.96 [7.21, 8.72] 7.90 [7.13, 8.67] 
PCL Time 2 (after manipulation)  
Total 27.03 [24.95, 29.11] 27.89 [24.56, 31.22] 
Intrusions 8.49 [7.60, 9.39] 8.53 [7.41, 9.65] 
Arousal 7.61 [6.85, 8.37] 8.10 [6.80, 9.40] 














condition or interaction between condition and time, suggesting elaboration did not affect 
overall analogue PTSD symptoms (ps>.05). 
3.3 Intrusions 
We measured intrusions in three ways: during the 10-minute monitoring period (prior 
to our manipulation), during the 24-hour delay period and after T2 using the EIS. We 
wondered whether elaboration would encourage intrusions about the photos, and/or alter 
intrusion characteristics at the two later time points. We therefore compared our conditions 
on intrusion frequency and characteristics at each time point. 
There was large variation in intrusion frequency during the monitoring period 
(M=3.23 95% CI [2.71, 3.74], range: 0-14); some participants (Elaboration: N=8; Control: 
N=4) experienced no intrusions6. Of those who experienced intrusions, many (48.9%) 
indicated that most were images, 4.3% said primarily thoughts and 45.7% indicated they were 
mainly a combination of images and thoughts. Table 3 displays intrusion frequency and 
characteristic ratings by condition. Importantly, intrusion frequency and characteristics did 
not significantly differ between conditions prior t the manipulation (ps >.05). However, 
there was a non-significant trend for the elaboratin condition to report fewer intrusions 
during the monitoring period compared to the control condition.  
Next, we examined whether elaboration encouraged partici nts to ruminate on their 
intrusions and/or voluntarily think or talk about the photos. But conditions were comparable 
on the Response to Intrusions Questionnaire scores (p=.64) and the percentage of participants 
who indicated voluntarily thinking or talking about the photos did not significantly differ 
between the control (59.3%) and elaboration conditions (62.7%), χ2 (1)=0.13, p=0.71, ϕ= 
0.04.  
                                               
6 Although 8 participants from the elaboration condition did not experience any intrusions during the monitoring 
period—and therefore did not complete the elaboratin exercise in the lab—recall the experimenter still 
instructed all participants from the elaboration condition to complete the exercise for intrusions experienced 














Finally, we examined intrusions experienced during the 24-hour delay, following 
exposure to the elaboration manipulation. Mean intrusion frequency was 2.12, 95% CI [1.75, 
2.49], range: 0-10). Nineteen participants did not experience intrusions (Control: N=9, 
Elaboration: N=10). Interestingly, although intrusion characteristics were comparable across 
conditions, the elaboration condition reported signif cantly fewer intrusions and scored 
significantly lower on the EIS—which measures the frequency, unwantedness and 
unpredictability of participants’ intrusions—relative to control participants (see Table 3). To 
ensure the intrusion frequency difference was not driven by pre-existing group differences on 
factors predisposing people to intrusions, we examined the effect of condition on diary 
intrusion frequency after statistically controlling for monitoring period intrusion frequency, 
trait anxiety and trauma exposure. An ANCOVA showed the effect of condition on intrusion 
frequency remained statistically significant, F(1, 100)=4.13, p=.045, ηp
2=.04 [.00, .14]. Taken 



























Comparison of mean involuntary cognition frequency, involuntary cognition characteristic 
ratings, and EIS scores between the control and elaboration condition.  
Note. EIS: Experience of Intrusions Scale, RIQ: Response to Intrusions Questionnaire, MP: 
Monitoring Period, D: Diary 
 
How do we explain elaboration causing a small reduction in intrusions? Information-
processing theories argue that when people fail to integrate sensory-based trauma 
representations (the sights) with their conceptual event representations (the event’s meaning), 
intrusions occur. According to Ehlers and Clark (2000), persistent PTSD occurs when a 
trauma memory is poorly contextualized, and intrusion  will reduce when the trauma’s 
meaning is processed in an organized way. The elaboration task may have encouraged 
 Elaboration  Control  Statistic 
Before 
Manipulation 
   
Frequency (MP) 2.75 [2.05, 3.44] 3.67 [2.91, 4.44] t(104)=1.79, p=.08, d=0.35 [-.04, 0.73] 
Characteristics (MP)    
   Distress 3.05 [2.67, 3.43] 2.84 [2.53, 3.15] t(92)=0.84, p=.40, d=0.18 [-0.23, 0.58] 
   Vividness 3.19 [2.88, 3.50] 3.29 [3.01, 3.58] t(92)=0.52, p=.61, d=0.11 [-0.30, 0.51] 
   Suppression 3.70 [3.33, 4.06] 3.80 [3.43, 4.18] t(92)=0.41, p=.69, d=0.08 [-0.32, 0.49] 
   Here and Now 1.81 [1.50, 2.13] 2.04 [1.73, 2.35] t(92)=1.01, p=.31, d=0.21 [-0.20, 0.62] 
   Aware  3.26 [2.83, 3.68] 3.22 [2.83, 3.60] t(92)=0.14, p=.89, d=0.03 [-0.38, 0.44] 
   Out of the Blue 3.33 [3.02, 3.63] 3.27 [2.99, 3.56] t(92)=0.25, p=.81, d=0.05 [-0.36, 0.46] 
   Visual Detail 3.42 [3.07, 3.76] 3.57 [3.27, 3.86] t(92)=0.67, p=.50, d=0.14 [-0.27, 0.55] 
After Manipulation 
   
Frequency (D) 1.67 [1.25, 2.09] 2.55 [1.96, 3.13] t(104)=2.45, p=.016, d=0.47 [0.08, 0.85] 
Characteristics (D)     
   Distress 2.74 [2.39, 3.08] 2.92 [2.58, 3.26] t(85)=0.76, p=.45, d=0.16 [-0.26, 0.58] 
   Vividness 3.15 [2.85, 3.44] 3.21 [2.89, 3.52] t(85)=0.28, p=.78, d=0.06 [-0.36, 0.48]  
   Suppression 3.21 [2.82, 3.61] 3.56 [3.20, 3.92] t(85)=1.33, p=.19, d=0.29 [-.14, 0.71] 
   Here and Now 1.84 [1.57, 2.10] 1.88 [1.59, 2.16] t(85)=0.20, p=.84, d=0.04 [-0.38, 0.47] 
   Aware  4.12 [3.84, 4.41] 3.71 [3.41, 4.02] t(85)=1.97, p=.052, d=0.42 [-0.003, 0.85] 
   Out of the blue 3.35 [2.98, 3.72] 3.15 [2.81, 3.49] t(85)=0.81, p=.42, d=0.17 [-0.25, 0.59] 
   Emotional 3.02 [2.70, 3.34] 2.96 [2.63, 3.28] t(85)=0.27, p=.79, d=0.05 [-0.36, 0.48] 
EIS score 5.80 [4.78, 6.82] 7.18 [6.24, 8.13] t(104)=1.99, p=.049, d=0.39 [0.001, 0.77] 














conceptual processing, therefore reducing intrusions. Indeed, some manipulations designed to 
interfere with conceptual processing—a concurrent vrbal task when watching a trauma 
analogue—enhance intrusions (Bourne, Frasquilho, Roth, & Holmes, 2010; Holmes, Brewin, 
& Hennessey, 2004). However, several studies have found no effect or a decrease in 
intrusions following similar conceptual processing manipulations (Krans, Naring, & Becker, 
2009; Pearson, Ross, & Webster, 2012), casting doubt on this explanation.  
Alternatively, some PTSD theories argue perceptual priming and fear conditioning 
cause intrusions (Michael, Ehlers, & Halligan, 2005; Rothbaum & Davis, 2003). According 
to the fear conditioning account, a trauma (the unconditioned stimulus) triggers an 
unconditioned fear response. This unconditioned respon e becomes associated with cues 
related to the unconditioned stimulus, such as objects present during the trauma. 
Consequently, these cues can cause similar responses to the unconditioned response (the 
conditioned response), including intrusions. Thus, one possibility is that elaborating caused 
more specific—and easily distinguished—memory traces for the photos.  The range of 
associations between the photos and certain cues may have been narrower, relative to control 
participants who may have had quite general memories f the photos. Indeed, this outcome 
would mean elaboration participants were less sensitive to intrusions when encountering cues 
compared to controls.    
Importantly, although we cannot determine the precise mechanism from these data, 
we can use this unintended intrusion manipulation to test the reality-monitoring explanation: 
fewer intrusions should cause less memory amplificat on and memory distortion due to less 
opportunity for reality-monitoring errors. Thus, the elaboration condition should show less 
memory amplification and memory distortion, relative to control participants. Next, we test 
this assumption.  














 We aimed to test whether elaboration of intrusions would affect participants’ 
tendency to respond “old” to test items over time (mory amplification) and their ability to 
distinguish between old and new photos over time (sensitivity). To separate sensitivity from 
response bias, we used a signal detection method (Stainslaw & Todorov, 1999). We classified 
old photos as signal events and new, negative photos as noise events: identifying an old photo 
as “old” was coded as a hit, and identifying a new negative photo as “old” was coded as a 
false alarm. We calculated signal detection measures d’ and c, where d’ denotes sensitivity 
and c denotes response bias. Note that c < 0 represents a response bias toward responding 
“old,” and c > 0 indicates a response bias toward responding “new”. Increasing d’ values 
indicate a greater ability to distinguish old test items from new test items. We compared 
sensitivity and response bias before and after the elaboration manipulation, using 2 
(Elaboration, Control) x 2 (Time 1, Time 2) mixed ANOVAs. 
For sensitivity, there was a significant main effect of time; participants were worse at 
distinguishing between old and new photos at T2 (M=1.27, 95% CI [1.16, 1.37]) compared to 
T1 (M=1.87, [1.71, 2.02]]), F(1, 104)=69.09, p<.001, ηp
2=.40 [.26, .51]. However, there was 
no significant main effect of condition (F(1, 104)=.13, p=.72, ηp
2=.001 [.00, .05]), or 
interaction between condition and time (F(1, 104)=0.92, p=.34, ηp
2=.009 [.00, .07]), 
suggesting that elaboration did not affect sensitivity. 
For response bias, there was a significant main effect of time, F(1, 104)=27.74, 
p<.001, ηp
2=.21, 95% CI [.09, .34]. Like previous research (Oulton et al., 2016), participants 
became less biased to respond “old” to the photos at T2 (M=-0.02 [-.13, .10]) compared to T1 
(M=-0.25 [-.35, -.15]).  Although there was no significant main effect of condition (F 1, 
104)=0.26, p=.61, ηp
2=.002 [.00, .05]), there was a significant interaction7 between condition 
                                               
7 Note that when we excluded participants who completed Test 2 more than 36 hours after Test 1 the interac ion 
effect was stronger F(1, 92)=7.63, p=.007, ηp
2=.08 [.01, .19]. Similarly, when we excluded participants who did 
not experience any intrusions during the monitoring period, the interaction effect was also slightly sronger, F(1, 
92)=4.69, p=.033, ηp














and time, F(1, 104)=4.48, p=.037, ηp
2=.04 [.00, .14]. Specifically, elaboration participants 
showed a greater change in response bias towards saying “new” to the items over time (T1: 
M=-.33[-.48, -.18]] T2; M= .01 [-.17, .19]; t(50)=4.97, p<.001, d=0.57 [0.32, 0.83]) compared 
to control participants (T1: M= -.18[-.31, -.05] T2; M=-.04 [-.20, .12]; t(54)=2.34, p=.023, 
d=0.27 [0.04, 0.50].  
3.5 Memory Confidence 
We compared mean confidence scores for Old and New test items before and after the 
elaboration manipulation, using a 2 (Elaboration, Control) x 2 (Time 1, Time 2) mixed 
ANOVAs. There was a significant main effect of time for old photos; confidence 
significantly reduced over time (T1: M=8.85 [8.69, 9.01], T2: M=8.24 [7.99, 8.49]), F(1, 
104)=35.36, p<.001, ηp
2=.25; but not for new photos (T1: M=7.55 [7.25, 7.86], T2: M=7.68 
[7.39, 7.96]), p >.05. Indeed, false alarm rates did not significantly differ across time 
(t(105)=1.18, p=.24), which may explain this finding. Critically there were no significant 
main effects of condition or interactions between co dition and time for both old and new 
photos (ps>.05).  
3.6 Memory Amplification and Analogue Symptoms 
We examined whether PTSD symptoms and intrusions were positively related to 
memory amplification and whether the presence and/or strength of these relationships would 
depend on whether intrusions were elaborated on. We calculated a change in response bias 
(or memory amplification) score by subtracting c scores at T2 from scores at T1. Positive 
values represented becoming more biased to respond “new”, and negative values represented 














variable with symptom measures and baseline characteristics for both conditions separately. 
Table 48 shows the results. 
Table 4.  
Correlations (and 95% CIs) between memory amplification and baseline characteristics, 
analogue symptoms, involuntary cognitions and voluntary thinking in the control and 
elaboration condition.  
 
  Memory Amplification   
 Control Elaboration Total Sample 
Baseline Characteristics    
HMS -.04 (N=55) -.17 (N=50) -.09 (N=105) 
TS -.27* (N=55) -.20 (N=50) -.19 (N=105) 
PPD -.08 (N=55) -.09 (N=50) -.08 (N=105) 
PCL-5 -.31*(N=55) -.23 (N=51) -.25**(N=106) 
STAI-T -.19 (N=55) -.14 (N=51) -.10 (N=106) 
BDI-II -.18 (N=55) -.10 (N=51) -.13 (N=106) 
GRS .06 (N=55) -.16 (N=51) -.04 (N=106) 
Analogue PTSD Symptoms (Time 2)    
PCL Total  -.33*  (N=55) .05 (N=51) -.09 (N=106) 
PCL Intrusions  -.37** (N=55) .04 (N=51) -.14 (N=106) 
PCL Avoidance -.18 (N=55) .06 (N=51) -.03 (N=106) 
PCL Arousal -.26 (N=55) .02 (N=51) -.07 (N=106) 
Intrusions    
Monitoring Period Frequency -.16 (N=55) .05 (N=51) -.10 (N=106) 
Diary Frequency -.26 (N=55) .06 (N=51) -.17 (N=106) 
EIS -.33* (N=55) .01 (N=51) -.19 (N=106) 
Voluntary Thinking    
RIQ -.31*(N=45) .07 (N=39) -.14 (N=84) 
Voluntary Thoughts Frequency .05 (N=32) -.07 (N=32) -.01 (N=64) 
 
Note.*p<.05, **p<.01 
Among elaboration participants, there were no significant relationships. Among 
control participants, memory amplification was associated with PTSD symptoms (in relation 
to the photos and their most traumatic event) and intrusion experience. That is, the more 
                                               
8 The number of participants are not consistent for some analyses due to the following reasons: (1) one 
participant within the elaboration condition did not c mplete the THS, (2) participants only rated how frequently 
they voluntarily thought/spoke about the photos if they responded “yes” to the question asking whether they had 
voluntarily thought or spoke about the photos and (3) the RIQ was only filled out by participants who indicated 














severe participants’ PTSD symptoms, the more biased participants became to respond “old” 
to photos over time. These correlations were medium in strength, according to Cohen’s 
(1988) benchmarks, and are comparable to correlation coefficients previously observed (King 
et al., 2000, Southwick et al., 1997). There was also  small relationship between intrusion 
frequency and memory amplification, but it did not reach statistical significance, r= -.26, 
p=.052.  
Taken together, elaboration did not affect sensitivity, but it eradicated the relationship 
between PTSD symptoms and memory amplification. Elabor tion participants may have 
easily differentiated experienced and imagined details because the imagined details were less 
vivid and/or participants could remember the experience of imagining these details. 
Consequently, memory distortion was comparable across c nditions and intrusion frequency 
did not affect memory amplification among the elabor ti n condition. Conversely, among 
control participants who did not reflect on their intrusions’ content, an overall sense that the 
trauma analogue was particularly graphic might arise. Therefore, the more these participants 
re-experienced the photos, the less evidence they might have required to respond “old” to 
negative photos.  
Our findings also suggest effortful imagination of new trauma-related details slightly 
reduces intrusions and encourages a tendency to not endorse trauma exposure. Perhaps, the 
spontaneous and non-deliberate nature of involuntary el borative cognitions—and, 
particularly, their lack of context—is essential for amplification to occur; these qualities may 
prohibit conceptual processing, maintaining intrusion . Alternatively, elaboration perhaps 
encouraged more specific memories, causing less sensitivity to trauma-related cues and 
therefore fewer intrusions. Indeed, greater memory specificity may also explain why the 














participants, elaboration participants may have been r luctant to endorse photos that were 
only vaguely related to the themes depicted in the photos.   
Given these possibilities, perhaps the specificity of elaboration is critical in 
determining whether amplification will occur. We designed our elaboration instructions to 
discourage abstract thinking—specifically, over-general rumination about the trauma and its 
consequences—because we wanted to determine the effect of imagination exclusively.  But 
abstract thinking may be critical, because it enhances both the internal generation of new 
details, encourages less memory specificity and maintains intrusions. Relatedly, the valence 
of elaboration may determine whether intrusions and subsequent memory amplification will 
occur. Indeed, participants who viewed negative pictures with moderate outcome contextual 
statements (“there were many survivors”) experienced fewer intrusions than participants who 
viewed pictures paired with severe outcome statements (“there were few survivors”; Krans, 
Pearson, Maier, & Moulds, 2016). It also possible that elaboration worked similarly to 
imagery modification techniques used in cognitive th rapy for PTSD. For example, we know 
that when people visualize a past trauma, “fast-forwarding” from the most distressing 
moment to the time when the person felt safe can help change negative appraisals (e.g., “I 
will never be well again”) and reduce subsequent re-experiencing (Ehlers, Clark, Hackmann, 
McManus, & Fennell, 2005). Given we did not tell participants to elaborate in a way that 
made the memory more or less negative, it is possible that participants were inclined to 
elaborate in a more adaptive way that emulated imagery modification techniques in cognitive 
therapy. Future studies could try instructions priming more negative-oriented thinking or give 
more generic instructions, such as asking participants to think about the trauma’s meaning 
and consequences. 
Although elaboration participants presumably imagined more trauma-related details, 














participants could easily differentiate between imagined and witnessed details because 
memories for imagined details were experienced differently (less vivid and emotional). 
Alternatively, perhaps the delay between elaboration and the second memory test was too 
short for traces of cognitive operations—a characteistic associated with imagined 
information (Johnson et al., 1993)—to decay. Finally, e aboration may have not affected 
sensitivity simply because the elaboration condition experienced fewer intrusions.  Put 
differently, although elaboration participants imagined more details—which should enhance 
reality-monitoring errors—the trauma analogue also intruded less frequently—which should 
reduce reality-monitoring errors. Determining a manipulation that does not confound 
imagination with intrusion frequency should be a research priority. 
Our study has limitations. First, our trauma analogue does not provoke the same fear 
evoked by real-life traumas. Second, unlike the field studies, participants never viewed the 
same test items twice—because this would have introduced additional source confusion. 
Consequently, our findings do not tell us how memory changed over time for specific photos, 
only how memory sensitivity and bias changed overall. Third, because we included the time 
participants spent describing their intrusions within t e 10 min monitoring period time limit, 
we may have underestimated intrusion frequency for participants with many intrusions. Note, 
however, participants on average spent less than one mi ute to describe an intrusion 
(M=48.10 s, 95% CI [45.02, 51.18]). Finally, our elaboration task was necessarily artificial. 
Nevertheless, trauma survivors might engage in similar processes (e.g., imagining the scene, 
contextualizing the event) in real-world settings, including police interviews. 
Overall, elaboration caused fewer intrusions and an increased bias to not endorse 
trauma exposure. While these findings are partly consistent with a reality-monitoring 
explanation for amplification, our findings might also reflect elaboration causing greater 














Nevertheless, our results also suggest that intrusions may contribute to memory 
amplification, as evidenced by the correlations we observed in the control condition. 
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“Recall that the photos you viewed were of real events that happened 
throughout the world. With the intrusion that you have described in mind, we 
would like you to now imagine that you are present at hat scene you have 
pictured, or at the scene your thought relates to. Take some time to form a 
mental image of the specific events that could have occurred beforehand and 
led to the events occurring in the scene. In other wo ds, try to visualize what 
would have happened leading up to the event. Specifically, what were you 
doing beforehand? Who was present? We would also like you to imagine what 
would happen after the events occurring in the scene, as a result of these 
events: both in the immediate future and after some ti  has elapsed. Imagine 
how you would react or what you would do in response to the event. Imagine 
what might happen to the victim(s) as a result of this event. 
In a few sentences, please describe what you imagined i  the space provided 

























The guy on the train tracks was dead. He must have jumped in front of the train in order to kill 
himself. I imagine there were people on the train and certainly the driver who witnessed the 
event  & the result. They probably will have difficulty understanding why he did it and they 
won't be able to forget about what happened. Maybe they will have nightmares. I think the guy 
was alone at the time but maybe he had loved ones who will be upset. If I were there, I would 
try to cover him up with something to preserve his dignity & so that other people are not 
traumatized. 
The intrusion was of the three bodies that were lying on the ground with their heads 
blown/shot off in what looked like a war zone. /  / We were all hiding from the enemy. A group 
of people were hiding when the enemy stormed in and shot the three armed men. /  / Led to 
further hiding and mourning. Having to inform families of victims. /  / Bodies sent back to 
home country. 
 
I imagined I was at the office when I got called to investigate the crime scene. I'm walking up 
the driveway with numerous cops standing around - I get a strong feeling of unease. I make my 
way to the bedroom where the crime happened and feel a lump in my throat, like something 
trying to stop the vomit from coming out of my mouth. I get a sick feeling like I need to use the 
bathroom as I get closer to take photos. There are v ious forensic people doing their job as I 
was doing mine.  /  / I go home later that night unable to sleep. Dreading going to the office to 
look over the pictures I've taken with my colleagues. The victims family decided to cremate the 
body once investigation is complete.   
 
i am at university when the fire alarm goes off. i ollow the fire protocol, but make a wrong 
turn and end up walking through an area where the fire has been. that's when i see the child on 
the ground covered in 3rd degree burns. i call the campus emergency line. likely i will 
experience some sort of counseling to deal with what  have seen. moreover the child likely did 
not survive. 
 
I imagined as if i was in my home town and there was a severe earth quake that shattered 
buildings. My immediate response was to run to an open area and then call up for emergency 
services. I imagine there would be loss of lives due to the incident 
 
Beforehand they could've been using corrosive chemicals maybe in a lab by themselves. After 
spilling the chemicals on themself they may have tried to wash away the chemical and call for 
help. In the future, it would have both psychological and physical impacts for the victim. 
 
It was in an area where there is civil unrest and or war. The village was attacked and everyone 
was killed. The man was disposing of the body e.g. taking the child to a mass grave. I was a 
visitor to the area. I can't, I would like to think I would bury them properly and do my best to 
help the authorities find who was responsible but I have difficulty imagining myself in that 
situation. 
 
I'm walking past and see a man fall onto the tracks of an oncoming train. As he hits the tracks, 
his shoulder/head is severed off and the train driver hits the brakes, filling the Autumn air with 
fumes from the brakes and fresh blood. The police come, the man is identified and I am taken 
in for questioning. AS it is established the man fell I am only there to explain the scene.  The 
train driver takes the accident to heart and can't cope. Having no-one to talk to he confides in 















• We tested whether imagining new details about trauma causes memory amplification  
• Subjects who elaborated had fewer intrusions than controls.   
• Subjects who elaborated showed less memory amplification than controls. 
